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Hiibel v. Sixth JudicialDistrict Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004)
William R. Snyder, Jr.*
Upon receiving a call reporting possible domestic violence, a sheriff s
deputy in Humboldt County, Nevada detained Petitioner under the
authority of a state statute allowing an officer to "stop and identify" a
person suspected of criminal behavior.' During the course of the detention,
the deputy repeatedly asked Petitioner to identify himself, but Petitioner
refused.2 The deputy then arrested Petitioner for obstructing an officer's
legal duty in failing to provide his name.3 A justice of the peace in Union
Township tried and convicted Petitioner, finding that Petitioner's actions
violated a state statute.4 The district court affirmed Petitioner's conviction
after finding the public interest in requiring Petitioner to identify himself
to be more sacrosanct than the constitutional rights violated.' Petitioner

* J.D. expected, 2006, University of Florida Levin College of Law.
1. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2455 (2004). An officer is permitted to
detain a suspicious person who has been stopped by the officer for a brief time and to take steps to
investigate further. NEV. REV. STAT. 171.123 (2003); Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2458. Under the Nevada
"stop and identify" statute, it is an officer's legal dutyto detain persons under reasonably suspicious
circumstances, and it is an officer's prerogative to demand that the suspects identify themselves.
NEV. REV. STAT. 171.123 (2003); Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2455-56. The suspicious circumstances
noted by the officer in the instant case were skid marks in the gravel behind Petitioner's truck, a
tip that an assault had occurred, and the officer's observation that Petitioner may have been
intoxicated. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Court, 59 P.3d 1201, 1203 (Nev. 2002), aff'd, 124 S. Ct. 2451
(2004).
2. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2455. The detaining officer asked Petitioner to identify himself
eleven times, but each time Petitioner refused, putting his hands behind his back and defying the
officer to take him to jail. Id. Petitioner later claimed that the detaining officer never asked him to
identify himself but instead asked for Petitioner's "papers." Larry Dudley Hiibel, Editorial, He
Fought the Law, andthe Law Won, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, June 29, 2004, at 19A. While seemingly
a minor issue of fact, the distinction between asking for papers and asking someone to identify
himself is a rather large one in Fourth Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence. For a greater
discussion of this distinction, see Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1209 (Agosti, J., dissenting) (noting that
because Nevada does not allow an officer to seize a person's wallet in order to find identification,
an officer should not be able to demand that a suspect pour out the contents of his own mind).
3. Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1203.
4. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2456.
5. Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1203-04. The court applied a balancing test, weighing the public
interest in protection against an individual's interest in autonomy. Id. at 1203. The court found that
the deputy's request for identification from Petitioner was reasonable and necessary. Id
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appealed to the Supreme Court of Nevada, which, sitting en banc, held that
the Nevada statute allowed a reasonable and minimal invasion of personal
privacy and was constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 6 Again
Petitioner appealed, this time to the United States Supreme Court. The
Court granted certiorari,7 and affirming the line of decisions below, HELD,
that a suspect detained on reasonable suspicion who refuses to surrender
his identity contrary to state law cannot claim a seizure violative of the
Fourth Amendment.'
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures.9 In defining what qualifies as a reasonable search and seizure,
courts once followed a bright-line rule requiring probable cause, as the
Fourth Amendment seemingly requires. ° However, the United States
Supreme Court's decision in a landmark case signaled the beginning of the
Court's willingness to reconsider the traditionally strict limitations of the
Fourth Amendment."1
Terry v. Ohio, decided in 1968, was the Court's first inquiry into
whether a lesser standard of suspicion could satisfy the Fourth

6. Id. at 1206. Petitioner further argued, both before the Supreme Court of Nevada and the
United States Supreme Court, that the "stop and identify" statute as construed also violated his
constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2460; Hiibel, 59 P.3d at
1203. While the alleged violations of Petitioner's Fifth Amendment rights are beyond the scope of
this Case Comment, for a shrewd analysis of those rights, see Hilbel, 124 S. Ct. at 2461-64
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
7. Hilbel, 124 S. Ct. at 2456. The issue was whether the officer's request was reasonably
related to the scope of the circumstances which justified the stop. Id. at 2460.
8. Id. at 2459. The Court held that a "state law requiring a suspect to disclose his name in
the course of a valid Terry stop is consistent with Fourth Amendment prohibitions against
unreasonable searches and seizures." Id.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
Id.
10. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 35 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting). The justification for
not allowing the detention of a person on less than probable cause was in part based on the fact that
allowing a police officer to detain a citizen under such a standard would authorize police to take
greater action than could a court of law. Id. at 36 n.3 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
11. See id. at 35-36 (Douglas, J., dissenting). As a sign of the then-accepted position in
Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence, Justice Douglas was baffled that the Court would recognize even
a minor exception to the bright-line rule of probable cause in allowing search and seizure, arguing
that probable cause should not be riddled with exceptions. Id. at 38 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Amendment's requirement of probable cause in effectuating a seizure. 12 In
Terry, the Court considered whether the public interest in safety allows a
police officer to frisk a suspect even though the officer has no probable
cause for the suspect's detention. 3 Contrary to years of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, which had viewed probable cause as an
unyielding principle, the Terry Court seemed to view the requirement of
probable cause as a manipulable continuum, wherein personal liberties
could be sacrificed so long as the government interest was substantial.
Thus, the Court stated that the new test for a Fourth Amendment seizure
required balancing the need for the search against the invasiveness of the
search. 4
The Terry Court recognized the serious intrusion upon the sanctity of
the person caused when an officer detains an individual and restricts his
freedom.' 5 However, the Court reasoned that a minor exception to the
requirement of probable cause was justified by the possible harm an armed
suspect can cause to the public or to the arresting officer.' 6 Accordingly,
the Court held that when a suspect is believed to be armed and dangerous,
an officer has a limited right to detain the individual and ensure his own
safety by performing a restricted patdown of the suspect, regardless of
whether probable cause exists. 1' Hence, the Court's ruling was simply
intended to be a minor exception ensuring the safety of the law
enforcement officer. Stressing that the probable cause requirement could
not be circumvented arbitrarily by a police officer, the Court failed to
address all the limitations that the Fourth Amendment places on
governmental intrusion.' 8 After abolishing the old bright-line requirement
of probable cause, the Court explicitly recognized the difficulty of forming

12. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2458 (noting that "[b]eginning with Terry v. Ohio, the Court has
recognized that a law enforcement officer's reasonable suspicion that a person may be involved in
criminal activity permits the officer to stop the person for a brief time") (citation omitted).
13. Terry, 392 U.S. at 7-8. In Terry, a police officer noticed three men involved in suspicious
activity and detained and searched the suspects. Id. at 6-7. Upon finding that two of the suspects
were carrying concealed firearms, the officer arrested them. Id. at 7. The suspicious activity noted
by the police officer consisted of two men repeatedly walking back and forth in front of a store,
surreptitiously glancing into the window. Id. at 6. The officer testified that "after observing their
elaborately casual and oft-repeated reconnaissance of the store window ... he suspected the two
men of 'casing a job, a stick-up."' Id.
14. Id. at 20-21 (citing Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-37 (1967)).
15. Id. at 16-17.
16. Id. at 30-31.
17. Id. at 30.
18. Id. at 29. The Court went on to note that "[tihese limitations [upon the expansion of the
Fourth Amendment] will have to be developed in the concrete factual circumstances of individual
cases." Id.
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a new bright-line rule predicated on a diminished standard of probable
cause. 19

In Papachristouv. City of Jacksonville, the Court reconsidered some
aspects of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in light of the discretionary
power some states gave law enforcement officers.20 Papachristouinvolved
a municipal ordinance that permitted police officers to arrest citizens on
a variety of pretexts, ranging from vagrancy to juggling to living off the
earnings of one's own wife. 2' The ordinance, in the guise of a criminal
regulation, gave officers nearly unfettered discretion in identifying and
arresting suspicious characters.22 In Papachristou,the petitioner and her
friends were seen by officers parked in front of a used-car lot. 23 The same
used-car lot had been burglarized several times.24 Suspecting that the
petitioner was somehow involved with the previous robberies, the officer
arrested the petitioner.2" The petitioner was then convicted under the
Jacksonville ordinance for "prowling by auto."26 The City of Jacksonville
defended its law on the grounds of police efficiency, arguing that vagrancy
statutes were desirable because they allowed police to prevent crimes
before they occurred.27
Striking down the ordinance, the Court noted that the ordinance granted
too much discretion to officers, allowing them to arrest suspects without
the probable cause demanded by the Fourth Amendment.28 Whereas the
Fourth Amendment was intended to serve as a check on police power, the
Jacksonville ordinance was so broad as to allow arrest on nothing more
19. Id. For a discussion of Terry's practical effect on search and seizure, see Scott Lewis,
Terry Tempered or Torpedoed? The New Law of Stop and Frisk,Wis. B. BuLL., Aug. 1988, at 7-8.
20. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 169 (1972).
21. Id. at 158. The Jacksonville ordinance permitted the arrest of such diverse groups of
people as rogues, vagabonds, pilferers, and gamblers. Id. at 158 n. I (citing JACKSONVILLE, FLA.,
ORDINANCE CODE § 26-57 (1972)). One of the common threads underlying the different bases for
arrest under the ordinance was the fact that, alone, none of the circumstances would have satisfied
the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause. Id.at 162-63.
22. See id.at 165.
23. Id. at 158-59.
24. Id. at 159.
25. See id. at 159, 169.
26. Id. at 159. The petitioner was traveling with three friends of mixed racial composition
to a nightclub when she was arrested by police officers. Id. at 158-59. The police officers alleged
that the reason for the arrest was that the car in which the petitioner and her friends were traveling
had stopped by a used-car lot that had been recently broken into several times. Id.at 159. However,
at no time was there any probable cause for the petitioner's arrest. See id. at 168-69 (noting that
arrest of a citizen could not be grounded on the whim of a police officer or the loose tenets of an
overbroad ordinance).
27. See id. at 171. The Court opined that "[tlhe implicit presumption in these generalized
vagrancy standards-that crime is being nipped in the bud-is too extravagant to deserve extended
treatment." Id.
28. Id. at 168-69.
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than a vague suspicion of criminal activity.29 Moreover, the Court noted
that "[a]rresting a person on suspicion, like arresting a person for
investigation, is foreign to our system."3 The Court found that the
ordinance, in effect, made criminal those activities that by modem
standards are typically considered innocuous."1 Even though the broad
terms of the vagrancy ordinance greatly augmented the arsenal of law
enforcement, the Court held that the resulting infringement on personal
liberties could not be justified on the grounds of deference to
governmental interests.32
Hayes v. Floridawas another instance in which the Court considered
the limitation of personal liberties in pursuit ofprotecting law enforcement
power. 33 Suspected of playing a role in a series of burglary-rapes, the
petitioner in Hayes was detained by police officers, taken to the police
station, and fingerprinted. 34 However, during the investigation, the police
officers lacked both probable cause and a warrant.3 5 At issue in Hayes was
whether the suspect could be detained on the diminished standard of
reasonable suspicion where no danger existed to the arresting officer and
to enable police to
where the purpose of the detention was 3simply
6
prosecute criminal activity more effectively.
Applying the Terry balancing test, the Hayes Court refused to expand
the Terry doctrine, finding that the interests furthered by the police action
were insufficient to overcome the violation of the petitioner's Fourth
Amendment liberties .37 Even though the fingerprinting performed in Hayes
was a less serious intrusion than other types of imaginable searches and
detentions,38 the Court mirrored the reasoning in Papachristou,refusing
to uphold a diminished standard of suspicion simply to ensure greater
police efficacy.39 Implicitly recognizing that probable cause can be bent to
protect heightened government interests but cannot be broken for the sole
29. Id.
30. Id. at 169.
31. Id. at 163.
32. See id. at 165. The Court stated that "the net cast is large, not to give the courts the power
to pick and choose but to increase the arsenal of the police." Id.Because it gave too much
discretionary power to police, the ordinance was unconstitutional. Id. at 168-69.
33. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 812 (1985).
34. Id. at 812-13.
35. Id. at 812.
36. Id. at 813 (analogizing the facts of Hayes to those of Terry, where the police officer's
actions were grounded on reasonable suspicion).
37. Id at 815-17 (noting that the limits of a seizure under reasonable suspicion would have
to be narrowly tailored to ensure protection of personal liberties).
38. Id. at 814 (comparing Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969)).
39. See generally id. (finding that the goal of greater law enforcement efficiency was
worthwhile but was ultimately outweighed by the need to protect the personal liberties that would
be trampled en route).
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purpose of enabling greater law enforcement efficacy and authority,4" the
Hayes court refused to allow another exception to the Fourth
Amendment. 4 '
In the instant case, the Court relied on the Terry test to determine
whether the sheriffs deputy had unreasonably seized Petitioner.42
Balancing the intrusion on Petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights against
the promotion of legitimate aims through Petitioner's seizure, the Court
found that Petitioner's arrest for failure to identify himself was permissible
under the Fourth Amendment.43 Unlike in Hayes, where the Court viewed
an investigatory detention without probable cause as a circumvention of
the Fourth Amendment, the instant Court embraced the expansion of Terry
as an effective means of protecting the safety of law enforcement officers
and ensuring the efficacy of criminal investigations."
The instant Court began its analysis by recognizing the governmental
interests served by requiring a suspect to provide his name while detained
in the course of a Terry stop. 45 The safety of the police and the public in
dangerous situations was the foremost interest the Court recognized.46 In
addition, the instant Court noted that forcing a suspect to provide his name
would provide a secondary benefit: it would make the task of police
investigation more efficient. 47 Thus, in its reasoning, the Court gave
considerable weight to the interests furthered by the detaining officer's
learning a suspect's name.
Having found the governmental interests at stake substantial, the Court
moved to the second prong of the balancing test: the intrusion on the
Petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights.4 ' The Court observed that, because
the additional act of demanding a suspect's name did not change the basic
purpose, rationale, or Fpractical demands of a Terry stop, the Terry stop
remained reasonable.4 Thus, finding the intrusion in the instant case no
greater than it would have been under a normal Terry stop, the instant
Court stated that requiring a suspect to disclose his name was no great
imposition on that individual's rights.50
40. Id. at 815 (noting recent precedent in which the Court refused to extend the Terry doctrine
to allow investigative interrogations at police stations).
41. Id. at 815-16. In part, the Court's decision also was predicated on the transportation of
a suspect to a police station without the basis of probable cause. Id.
42. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451,2459 (2004) (citing Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)).
43. Id.
44. CompareHayes, 470 U.S. at 815, with Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2458.
45. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2458.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2461.
49. Id. at 2459.
50. Id. at 2461.
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Evaluating the prongs of the Terry balancing test, the Court determined
that the facts of the instant case weighed heavily in favor of protecting the
government's interests and allowing a police officer to demand a suspect's
identity.51 Although Petitioner argued that an individual's right to privacy
had been tacitly acknowledged by the Court for many years,52 the Court
rejected Petitioner's argument, finding that the right to privacy hinges
upon the importance of the governmental interests at stake.53 Ultimately
determining the government interests at stake to be significant and the
invasions on personal privacy to be de minimis, the Court affirmed the
decisions of lower courts,5 4 holding the Nevada statute constitutional.55
Joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg in his dissent, Justice Breyer
criticized the majority for straying from recognized limitations on Terry
stops.56 Justice Breyer argued that in light of the general right of privacy
under the Fourth Amendment, the intrusion on Petitioner's liberty
interest was much more insidious than the majority acknowledged.57
Finally, although conceding the importance of the Terry stop exception
to the Fourth Amendment, Justice Breyer concluded that probable cause
should be inviolable against further exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment.5"

51. Id. at 2459-60.
52. Id. at 2459. The Court did not attach significance to dicta from previous cases in its
analysis, stating, "we cannot view the dicta in Berkemer or Justice White's concurrence in Terry
as answering the question whether a State can compel a suspect to disclose his name during a Terry
stop." Id. Thus, the Court has examined privacy issues in light of Terry stops, e.g., Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring), and noted that a policeman may address questions
to anyone on the street, but that the person stopped is not obliged to respond and that answers may
not be compelled. Id. For further analysis of privacy in the context of Terry-like stops, see
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,436-42 (1984), and Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419,423-28
(2004).
53. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2458-59 (implying that the most important aspect of the
balancing test is the importance of the government interests at stake); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S.
210, 223-24 (1984) (finding that, because the government interest at stake was so significant, it
overrode minor intrusion on Fourth Amendment liberties).
54. See supranotes 4-8 and accompanying text.
55. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2457, 2459.
56. Id. at 2464-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[T]his Court's Fourth Amendment precedents
make clear that police may conduct a Terry stop only within circumscribed limits. And one ofthose
limits invalidates laws that compel responses to police questioning.").
57. Id. at 2465-66 (Breyer, J., dissenting); cf Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439 ("[An] officer may
ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain
information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions. But the detainee is not obliged to
respond.") (emphasis added); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1979) (holding that even the
government interest in prevention of crime cannot overcome guarantees of the Fourth Amendment).
58. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2465-66 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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The holding in the instant case testifies to the sacrifice of probable
cause on the altar of governmental deference. 9 A broader, more reflective
analysis of Petitioner's liberty interests in the context of probable cause
jurisprudence, would have demanded a conclusion different from that
reached by the instant Court.6" Instead, the instant Court has allowed the
seizure of a suspect based on nothing more than a bare suspicion and
nothing less than a failure to provide identification. By failing to
adequately consider the factual circumstances and accord appropriate
weight to these facts when using the Terry balancing test, the instant Court
unnecessarily broadened the Terry exception,6 ' and it may have heralded

59. See Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Court, 59 P.3d 1201, 1210 (2002) (Agosti, J., dissenting),
aff'd, 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004) ('It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense, we
would sanction the subversion of. . . liberties . . . which make[] the defense of the Nation
worthwhile."') (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258,264 (1967));
cf Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,459 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
Fourth Amendment rests on the principle that a true balance between the individual and society
depends on the recognition of 'the right to be let alone--the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men."') (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). For further analysis of the balance that courts have historically
sought to achieve, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1968), where the majority stated:
[T]he argument is made that the authority of the police must be strictly
circumscribed by the law of arrest and search as it has developed to date in the
traditional jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment. It is contended with some
force that there is not-and cannot be-a variety of police activity which does not
depend solely upon the voluntary cooperation of the citizen and yet which stops
short of an arrest based upon probable cause to make such an arrest. The heart of
the Fourth Amendment, the argument runs, is a severe requirement of specific
justification for any intrusion upon protected personal security.... Acquiescence
by the courts in the compulsion inherent in the field interrogation practices at
issue here, it is urged, would constitute an abdication ofjudicial control over, and
indeed an encouragement of, substantial interference with liberty and personal
security by police officers whose judgment is necessarily colored ....
Id. (footnote call number omitted).
60. Compare Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972) (indicating that
the Fourth Amendment would not bear intrusion on individual liberties without heightened
government interests being present), and Terry, 392 U.S. at 23-24 (recognizing a narrow exception
to the demands of probable cause by allowing an officer to ensure his own safety when it appeared
he was in imminent danger from a suspect), with Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1210 (Agosti, J., dissenting)
("The majority, by its decision today, has allowed the first layer of our civil liberties to be whittled
away. The holding weakens the democratic principles upon which this great nation was founded.").
61. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2465-66 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer argued that, because
no evidence was presented that the rule enunciated previously in Terry had prevented effective law
enforcement, the Court could not forsake its loyalty to the requirements of probable cause. Id. at
2466 (Breyer, J., dissenting). One commentator has noted the continuing expansion of the Terry
doctrine even where significant government interests are not at stake, writing that "the Court has
interpreted Terry in a way that gives police officers more discretion than Terry necessarily
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a return to the days of unchecked police discretion exemplified by the
Jacksonville ordinance at issue in Papachristou.
In neglecting to consider thoroughly the factual circumstances
surrounding Petitioner's seizure, the instant Court avoided acknowledging
the lack of criminal suspicion surrounding Petitioner's detention.62 Unlike
in Terry, where the suspect acted in concert with another individual casing
a store for a robbery,63 Petitioner in the instant case simply was standing
by his truck on the roadside.' The arresting officer had not personally
observed any suspicious behavior prior to making the Terry stop in the
instant case, although he had received a report of possible domestic
violence.65 According to the officer's own observations, Petitioner's
behavior merely appeared suspicious.' Petitioner was fully cooperative
with but one exception: he refused to provide identification.67 The record
indicates that at no time did the officer fear for his safety.6" Yet the Court
refused to accord the factual situation any weight, instead sanctioning an
exception to probable cause simply on the basis of its presumed utility to
law enforcement.69

authorizes." Rachel Karen Laser, Comment, Unreasonable Suspicion: Relying on Refusals to
Support Terry Stops, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1161, 1172 (1995). The Court seems to have continued that
unfortunate trend in the instant case.
62. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2455-56. Admittedly, the situation in the instant case is not
entirely devoid of grounds for suspicion, as was Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47,48-49 (1979), where
the suspect was detained and arrested on a hunch. However, the suspicion in the instant case is a
far cry from the probable cause demanded by the Fourth Amendment. Compare Hiibel, 124 S. Ct.
at 2455-56, with supratext accompanying note 16 (discussing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31). For further
insight into the Fourth Amendment balancing test performed by the Court and the skewed results
that may be achieved in its application, see INS v. Delgado,466 U.S. 210,228-29 (1984) (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
63. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5-7.
64. Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2455.
65. Id. Compare id. (where police officers had received information about possible illegal
activity but made no such independent observations aside from the generalized suspicion of
Petitioner's intoxication), with Terry, 392 U.S. at 23-24 (where the Court noted the danger of the
officer's situation).
66. Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2455. For Petitioner's own impressions of the events surrounding
his arrest, see Hiibel, supra note 2, at 19A.
67. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 59 P.3d 1201, 1203 (Nev. 2002), aff'd, 124 S.Ct. 2451
(2004).
68. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2455 (implicitly noting that the officer never seemed to fear for
his own safety although he had received reports of a possible domestic dispute). But see Hiibel,59
P.3d at 1203 (implying that though the arresting officer found that Petitioner seemed to be
intoxicated, aggressive, and moody in refusing to answer the officer's request for identification,
there was an insufficient basis for the suspect's detention under probable cause).
69. Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2458 (inferring possible situations where it would benefit a police
officer to know the identity of the suspect he had detained). But see supranotes 60-61 (discussing
that efficacy of law enforcement should not relate to expansion of the Fourth Amendment).
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Mere usefulness, however, does not measure up to the strict Terry
requirement of imminent danger to an arresting officer in order to evade
the necessity of probable cause.7" The instant Court's reasoning operates
under the premise that if an infringement is useful to law enforcement, it
is more likely to meet the demands of the Constitution.7' While technically
consistent with the nature of the Terry balancing test, the Court's emphasis
on weighing that infringement effectively eviscerates the spirit of the
Fourth Amendment. The very intention of the Fourth Amendment is to
protect against police action performed at the cost of personal liberty.72
The Court's "useful ergo constitutional" analysis thus runs contrary to the
strict prohibition embodied in the Fourth Amendment. Even as enunciated
by Terry, the Fourth Amendment was not meant to allow for inroads into
the probable cause requirement where there is no recognized imminent
danger to the public or to the arresting officer. 73 Thus, the Hayes Court
noted that where there is no heightened government interest at stake,
Terry's exception does not apply;74 without heightened government
interests, trespass on the Fourth Amendment guaranty of individual
autonomy is unjustifiable.75 In failing to similarly recognize that the

70. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972) (holding that vagrancy
statutes are not constitutional simply because they are effective tools of law enforcement); see
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968) (stating that the search "must be limited to that which is
necessary for the discovery ofweapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby").
Contrasupra note 69 and accompanying text.
71. SeeHiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2458.
72. See Laser, supranote 61, at 1163-64 (arguing that instead of being a tool used to expand
police power, "[t]he Fourth Amendment is in large part a check on police discretion"). For an
insightful perspective on the historical catalyst of the Fourth Amendment's creation, see generally
David E. Steinberg, The OriginalUnderstandingof UnreasonableSearches andSeizures, 56 FLA.
L. REV. 1051 (2004). Steinberg argues that the Fourth Amendment was intended to prevent
discretionary police authority. Id. at 1062-69. But see Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109
(1977) (stating that the reasonableness of a seizure depends "'on a balance between the public
interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law
officers"') (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)).
73. Most notably, the majority in Terry based its exception to the requirement of probable
cause largely on the inherent danger a police officer faces. Terry, 392 U.S. at 23-24.
74. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 815 (1985) (refusing to extend the Terry exception)
(citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979)); see also Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Court, 59
P.3d 1201, 1209 (Nev. 2002) (Agosti, J., dissenting), affd, 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004) ("The purpose
of such a search is to ensure the detainee is not armed with a weapon that could be immediately
used against a police officer, not to ensure against a detainee's propensity for violence based upon
a prior record of criminal behavior.").
75. ComparePapachristou,405 U.S. at 169 ("A vagrancy prosecution may be merely the
cloak for a conviction which could not be obtained on the real but undisclosed grounds for the
arrest."), with Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2455 (upholding the arrest and conviction although there was
insufficient evidence to meet the probable cause standard), and Martinelli v. City of Beaumont, 820
F.2d 1491, 1494 (9th Cir. 1987) (disallowing arrest based on reasonable suspicion where it would

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss2/7

10

Snyder: Slipping Down the Slope
Probable Cause: An Unreasonable Except
CASEof
COMMENT

interests presented by the government were not "heightened" under the
meaning of either Terry or Hayes, the Court erroneously lowered the
threshold for future inquiries into probable cause and reasonable seizure.76
In so doing, the instant Court has granted law enforcement officials a
range of discretion similar to that which it held unconstitutional in
Papachristou.
In failing to truly consider the factual circumstances of the instant case,
the instant Court also failed to concede the importance of the liberty
interests at stake." Prior to the instant decision, an officer in the course of
a Terry stop could frisk a suspect to ensure the suspect was not carrying
weapons, but that officer could not demand to see any other object the
suspect might be carrying.7" What the Court now sanctions is an act far
more violative of personal liberty than the mere relinquishing of tangible
property: a suspect must now empty his mind at the request of a police
officer.79 It has been ably argued that the greatest intrusion a person can
bear is being forced to use his mind to assist the Government, ° and yet it
is just such an intrusion that the Court disregarded and even condoned in
the instant case.8 '
Yet another liberty interest the instant Court ignored is the right to
privacy recognized under the Fourth Amendment. 2 The right to
privacy-or the "right to be let alone" in the words of Justice Brandeis-is
a fundamental right protected under the Fourth Amendment. 3 When
coupled with the right to wander freely and anonymously in society," an
allow bootstrapping of arrest on less than probable cause).
76. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
77. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2458-60.
78. Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1209 (Agosti, J., dissenting); see Grover C. Trask, II & Timothy J.
Searight, Proposition8 and the Exclusionary Rule: Towards a New Balance of Defendant and
Victim Rights, 23 PAC. L.J. 1101, 1124 (1992) ("It is difficult to reconcile why a lawfully detained
person may be fingerprinted, but that person's wallet or purse or other item where identification
might reasonably be kept may not be removed. It is debatable whether such a procedure is more
invasive than fingerprinting.").
79. For an interesting perspective on the confluence of Fifth Amendment and Fourth
Amendment protections in the context of Terry stops, see Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2461-64 (Stevens,
J., dissenting), arguing that the Nevada statute at issue in the instant case is violative of the Fifth
Amendment prohibition against being forced to bear witness against oneself
80. See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 219-21 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81. See supra text accompanying note 51.
82. Hiibel,59 P.3d at 1207-10 (Agosti, J., dissenting).
83. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);see Hiibel,
59 P.3d at 1204; Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451,468 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
84. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972); Union Pac. Ry. v.
Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) ("No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded,
by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority
of law.").
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individual's interest in self-determination seems nearly limitless. While the
Fourth Amendment as drafted by the Framers justly sacrifices that interest
where police have probable cause to suspect a person of criminal activity,85
the Court here has allowed for an even greater sacrifice on a far weaker
foundation. Ultimately, in holding that probable cause is not necessary to
force a suspect to reveal his identity, the instant Court has decided that
perhaps the liberty interests protected by the Fourth Amendment are not
so great after all. 6
The instant Court seemingly viewed the exception it created in the
instant case as a minor one. 7 However, when coupled with the Terry
exception, the loophole the Court has created in the instant case can have
far-reaching effect."8 Under the instant case, the detention of an individual
is justified on the mere pretext of law enforcement convenience-the
precise justification, oddly enough, that the Fourth Amendment was
intended to counter.8 9 How long can the Fourth Amendment withstand
such abuse of its intent and spirit? The Court's pretext for another
exception in the instant case does not further protect the significant
interests identified in Terry.90 Nor has it been shown that the Court's
expansion of its discretion will better arm law enforcement in combating
crime. 9' Thus, the very reason the Court allows the expansion is ironically
the very aim the Fourth Amendment was constructed to combat: the
promotion of police efficacy at the expense of personal liberty. 92
85. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
86. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2458-60; Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1206 ("To hold that a name, which
is neutral and non-incriminating information, is somehow an invasion ofprivacy is untenable. Such
an invasion is minimal at best.").
87. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2461 (finding liberty interest to be minimal and therefore easily
sacrificed to government interests at stake).
88. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
91. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2466 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1209 (Agosti, J.,
dissenting). However, even if the expansion of the Terry doctrine was shown to better enable law
enforcement to fight crime, it might still be held unconstitutional under the reasoning in
Papachristou.
92. Laser, supranote 61, at 1163. There is an inherent tension in the Court's holding in the
instant case; the Court weakens the protections of the Fourth Amendment for the purpose of
increasing police power even though the Fourth Amendment was designed for the express purpose
of preventing the exercise of such police powers. Compare Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2458 (allowing
officer broad discretion to determine what satisfies standard of"reasonable suspicion"), with Lewis,
supra note 19 (analyzing the modem trend in which courts interpret what is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment). Lewis states that, in the wake of Terry v. Ohio:
the stop and fiisk rules were fairly straightforward and applied equally to
pedestrian and vehicular investigative detention stops, which commonly became
known as Terry stops. However, rapidly developing changes in the law of stop and
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It may be said that the instant Court too easily sloughed off decades of
jurisprudence in christening an expansion of the Terry doctrine.93 Whereas
courts have long hesitated to invade the area of probable cause,94 the
instant Court's holding deferred even to weak governmental interests in
reducing personal liberty.95 In failing to consider personal liberties, the
instant case may very well be a harbinger of an even greater reduction of
personal liberties. Although protecting law enforcement officers and
investigating impending crime are certainly important, those governmental
interests should not supplant the instant Court's obligation to protect both
the Fourth Amendment and Petitioner's rights thereunder. 96 Disturbingly,
what began as a bright-line exception in Terry has burgeoned into case-byfrisk have diluted the process so much so [sic] that both the U.S. and Wisconsin
supreme courts now agree that law enforcement officers can best draw upon their
own training and instinct. Officers must balance their zealousness with the
public's privacy protections.
Lewis, supra note 19, at 7. By predicating its decision largely on the protection of governmental
interests for the furtherance of criminal investigation, the Court seems to have missed the most
basic reason for the Fourth Amendment: to protect suspects against unreasonable searches and
seizures by law enforcement. For a useful historical perspective on the Fourth Amendment, see Jon
Eldredge, National Perspective, Detainmentof UnitedStates Citizens as Enemy Combatants Under
a FourthAmendment HistoricalAnalysis,6 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 19, 21-32 (2004), noting that
prior to the Fourth Amendment, American colonists were subject to the vagaries of writs of
assistance obtained by customs officers. The writs of assistance themselves were often subject to
widespread abuse by customs officers where there was no basis for detention or seizure of a
suspect. Id. at 24. Eldredge noted that "'customs officers obtained writs of assistance on request
as routine accessories to their commissions, without alleging illegal activity as a pretext for them,
without judicial superintendence, and without the possibility of refusal."' Id. (quoting William J.
Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning 762-63 (1990) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School)). The Fourth Amendment was designed, in large
part, to guard against "[t]he possibility of a return to general warrants [which] underscored the
Framers' concerns about arbitrary police power and the absence of adequate judicial intervention."
Id. at 28. See generally Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourthAmendment, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 547 (1999) (noting that the Framers' intent in drafting the Fourth Amendment was to avoid
the type ofdiscretionary power that America had experienced while a colony of Great Britain). The
instant Court's decision, rather than an evolution in the area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
is a reversion to a bygone day where police discretion was nearly unfettered by judicial oversight.
After over two hundred years of Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence, the instant Court has interpreted
the requirements of probable cause to be precisely what the Framers sought to avoid.
93. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2465 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
94. See, e.g., Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 814-15 (1985); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47,
51-53(1979); cf Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,479 (1966) (refusing to recognize an exception
to the Fifth Amendment by finding the interrogation of a suspect violative of Fifth Amendment
rights).
95. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2458.
96. Cf. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 225-43 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (stating that the Court has an obligation to fairly balance liberty interest against
state interest).
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case avoidance of the Fourth Amendment's requirement of probable
cause.9 7 Such jurisprudence can only weaken the foundation of probable
cause and enfeeble the once-substantial protection of the Fourth
Amendment. 98 The Framers would be both appalled by the instant Court's
holding and fearful of slipping even further away from the ideals
represented by the necessity of probable cause.

97. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the progression of
Fourth Amendment erosion and its practical effects, see generally Kenneth Gavsie, Note, Making
the Best of "Whren ": The Problems with Pretextual Traffic Stops and the Need for Restraint,50
FLA. L. REv. 385 (1998).
98. In Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946), Justice Frankfurter noted:
It is easy to make light of insistence on scrupulous regard for the safeguards of
civil liberties when invoked on behalf of the unworthy. It is too easy. History
bears testimony that by such disregard are the rights of liberty extinguished,
heedlessly at first, then stealthily, and brazenly in the end.
Id. at 597 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,
474 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The imposition that seems diaphanous today may be
intolerable tomorrow.").
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